In views of the salience of cost, it is surprising that there have been no systematic public analyses of the economics of a military conflict in Iraq. This essay attempts to fill the gap. We must start by acknowledging that the estimates given here are virtually certain to be wrong in some respects, for the fog of war extends far beyond the battlefield to include forecasts of political reactions and economic consequences. However, as Keynes said, it is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.
An assessment of the costs of a war with Iraq needs to be based on scenarios for the conduct of the war, the aftermath of hostilities, the impacts on the oil market and other related markets, and the "macroeconomic" impacts, i.e., on the overall US economy. It is impossible to project detailed military strategies. However, we can describe the general contours of a "quick victory" and a "protracted conflict" and attempt to put price tags on each. The difference between good and bad cases does not depend on who will win, for there is little doubt among military specialists that the United States will prevail if it enters with overwhelming force and is willing to persevere through all obstacles. Rather, the difference lies in the duration of the conflict, the total damage to Iraq, civilian casualties, the potential for unconventional warfare, and the spread of the conflict outside Iraq. (John E. Mueller, Pub. Date: October 2005)
A study prepared by the Democratic staff of the House Budget Committee and other studies by private specialists such as Anthony H. Cordesman and Michael E. O'Hanlon lay out a plausible starting point for an analysis. These studies estimate that in order to achieve overwhelming force, the US will deploy between 150,000 and 350,000 personnel, which is approximately one half of the level deployed in the first Persian Gulf War of 1990 to 1991...............
