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Essay on External and Internal Causes of Innovation
A study of modern warfare suggests that whoever is first to combine new technologies with disruptive doctrine can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a military that is slow to adapt new ways of fighting to technological advance opens itself to catastrophic defeat. The historical record shows that disruptive innovation is an exceedingly difficult task. In fact, organizational theory teaches that noninnovation or stagnation is more or less the norm in the military and innovations will be rare. 8 Innovation scholars blame uniformed leaders, claiming they resist change because they are overworked and lack the time or the desire to transform.
James Q. Wilson, however, proposes a different reason why senior military leaders are biased toward stagnation. He notes in his illuminating study of military bureaucracy that senior military leaders 'are supposed to resist' innovation because they are responsible for enforcing the standard operating procedures (SOP) that provide the organization's stability.' Considering these negative propositions, security scholars concentrate on the external causes of military innovation (the why and when). External engines of change explanations include: Barry Posen's civilian intervention; Owen Cote's interservice competition; Steven Rosen's intraservice rivalry perspective; and Elizabeth Kier's cultural perspective. Although understanding the external factors (the why and when) that ignite and fuel the engine of innovation are important, failure to understand the internal factors (the how) that controls the engine can be fatal.
First was the advent of the steel ship in the Navy. Although it was investing aggressively in new technologies, the Navy resisted innovations that it viewed as disruptive. Eventually, of course, the obvious advantages of this technological advance overcame internal inertia and caused a paradigm shift - a complete turnaround in the way the Navy fought as well as in the way it structured and organized its units.Second was President John F. Kennedy's attempt to convince Army leadership to develop a counterinsurgency capability, which was defeated by classic internal inertia......
