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Essay on History of Phenomenology
Phenomenology seems to be a Proteus which appears now as an objective inquiry into the logic of essences and meanings, now as a theory of abstraction, now as a deep psychological description or analysis of consciousness, now as speculation on "the transcendental Ego," now as a method for approaching concretely lived existence, and finally, as in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, seems to blend purely and simply with existentialism (Jardine, D. W. 1988).
By now the skein is, to say the least, a bit tangled. However, it would be too easy to discredit phenomenology simply by accusing it of obscurity or confusion. A philosophy which after fifty years is still incapable of defining itself in a clear and univocal manner would stand accused by that very fact of an irremediable inconsistency.
If a method originally forged for a very particular and limited end has been able to take on so many varying forms, it is because it holds within itself a latent truth and efficacy, a power of renewal, a principle of progress which attests to an exceptional fecundity. Further, does not a good part of this obscurity come from our incapacity to hold on to all of these threads at once and to discern the profound unity of the diverse philosophies which claim the title of phenomenology.
Nevertheless, if the skein of phenomenology is particularly tangled, this is due to the specific character of this doctrine. The Cartesian Method was given at once in its completed form, straightforward in its intention, simple in its application; and Kant's critical method, after the dilatory researches of the pre-critical period, emerged fully matured and sure of it. Husserl, however, and phenomenology itself, winds and gropes its way, constantly retracing its steps, probing the unseen ground before it, continually putting everything in question. We can say that phenomenology paradoxically unites two qualifications, reputedly exclusive of one another: it is methodical and groping.................
