The plain sense that the criminal law is a highly specialized tool of social control, useful for certain purposes but not for others; that when improperly used it is capable of producing more evil than good; that the decision to criminalize any particular behavior must follow only after an assessment and balancing of gains and losses—this obvious injunction of rationality has been noted widely for over 250 years, from Jeremy Bentham, to the National Crime Commission, and by the moralistic philosophers as well as the utilitarian ones.
Most criminal laws proscribe actions which result in a direct and identifiable harm to another. Usually, the actor is subject to punishment only if he has acted knowingly, willfully, and intentionally. Murder, robbery, rape, arson, and embezzlement are typical examples. One or more victims suffer the consequences of another's antisocial conduct (REYNOLDS DAVID, 1995).
When, however, the criminal law begins to define certain petty offenses, this generalization is less applicable. There is not always a victim, or an identifiable harm, or an act that is knowing, willful and intentional, or even an act at all. These petty offenses fall roughly into three groups, each of which, to some degree, has an effect on the criminal process.
There are crimes without victims, acts which hurt no person in particular but offend society generally. Examples include laws against prostitution, abortion, homosexuality, gambling, obscenity, and possession (not sale) of narcotics.
There are also laws which do not punish action, but inaction, or the occupation of a particular status. Laws against public drunkenness and vagrancy are typical examples. Another popular law makes it a crime to be an able-bodied person with no visible means of support who does not seek work. Such as Oregon statute, the same statute makes it a crime to be a "common.......
