NATO Expansion: A Background
In June 1997, the European Council, meeting in Amsterdam, suggested that the European Commission should begin negotiations for membership of the European Union (EU) with the governments of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. A month later, at a NATO summit meeting in Madrid, invitations were issued to the governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks. A process began of separating Europe into ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Notwithstanding how frequently NATO and EU officials say that they do not intend to re-divide Europe, and regardless of how many ‘partnership’ agreements they offer to non-members, it is expected that admitting some countries to full membership of the two organizations and excluding others will produce ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Those countries that are neither EU ‘accession’ states (the shorthand term used to refer to the six states in the process of negotiation membership), nor ‘pre-ins’ (as Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta were classified in October 1999 when the European Commission planned opening negotiations for their accession), are, by definition, ‘outsiders’. Being ‘outside’ affects the way people identify themselves and their environment. It also affects their relationships with both ‘insiders’ and fellow ‘outsiders’. Exclusion from the expanding NATO alliance influences outsiders’ security view and the way they view their role in Europe. The perception of exclusion, as a result, has important consequences for the domestic and foreign policies of outsider states. Russia is the most important example of an excluded state, if only on account of its size and strategic importance. Regardless of Acting President Vladimir Putin’s widely quoted passing remark to David Frost on 5 March that he can see no reason why Russia should not join NATO eventually, the Russian government does not seek EU or NATO membership. It.......
