In affirmative action, a racial (or sexual) classification is used, and assigned more or less weight, in making a decision about the allocation of an important benefit—for example hiring into a job. As a result, it is sometimes true (though not all programs work this way) that a woman or minority applicant gets a position that would otherwise have gone to a white man. So there are often serious conflicts of interest at work (Steven, 2000). And even when there are not conflicts of interest—say, if a university establishes a transition program for minority students—there are serious questions about the permissibility of using these categories in assigning benefits and burdens, given their malign history and that they distinguish among equal citizens on the basis of characteristic that are of uncertain relevance.
The first objection is pragmatic. Some opponents of the use of racial categories argue that proponents are misguided about expected effects. They say that affirmative action will not advance the proponents own goal of a society with racial equality (Morrison, 1996). To the contrary, the use of racial categories will reinforce racial ways of thinking by giving them an official stamp of approval. By treating race, for example, as a basis for predicting a person’s values or beliefs or practices, we reinforce stereotypes, and encourage the view that people ought to be treated as members of racially defined groups.
The second objection is moral. According to these critics, the strategy is unfair and demeaning. It is unfair to non-beneficiaries because individuals have a right to be treated as equal individuals, not simply as members of groups: that, the majority says in “Adarand”, is the “basic principle” for which the 5th and 14th Amendments stand (Steven, 2000). The use of racial classifications violates that principle by assigning....
