Essay on
Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is not only
a milestone in study of ethics but also it is a landmark in study of ethical
actions. It provides the knowledge regarding the relationship between different
personal actions. It clarifies the direction for becoming a virtuous man. The
word "virtue" used, as is the position to which it achieves the eventual reason
of man existence. Aristotle differentiated the virtues into two categories,
intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue can be developed through teaching,
while moral virtue by habit. It is the role of a man to increase his own virtue
and improve an atmosphere favorable to moral development within society.
A study of theoretical ethics would
importantly needs an understanding of the source or ground for an ethical system
and would be forced to choose between rival systems. For Aristotle man is a
member of an essentially system of justice and it is his prime obligation to
enhance his own virtue through virtuous action as well improving the system
(Wayne H. Ambler, 1985; Richard Boedus, 1991).
Aristotle identifies a kind of "mixed"
actions whereby individuals are in fact applaud for submitting to some disgrace
or pain "as the price of some great and noble object" (NE 1110a22, b12).
Additionally, he proposes that such praiseworthy actions may engage the
endurance of pain. Ignorance is the one of the causes of involuntary actions.
Ignorance that eludes blame is not a general ignorance shown in moral choice but
a particular ignorance of "the circumstances of the act and of the things
affected by it" (NE 1111a1). Although "pleasure and nobility between them supply
the motives of all actions whatsoever," it is the environment of particular
situation that defines whether the action is voluntary or involuntary and so the
very possibility of virtue (NE 1110b12).
Aristotle concurs with universal belief
that actions originating in the agent can be the product of wish, desire,
strength, or opining, but he argues that none of these can be identified as
choices. (NE 1111b12-1112a13) As the debate of moral responsibility shows, the
virtues are only achievable if humans can accomplish some extent of freedom from
obligation or necessity. Necessity appears as the contrast of nobility.
Aristotle advises that necessity is deep-rooted in the bodily concerns for
self-preservation, physical pleasure, and material reward. One may perform a
courageous act, not for the reason of its moral excellence but for some other
material, social, or political objective. Courageous action could not freely
choose. It can be a necessary means, even if it is not the only possible means.
Aristotle demonstrates that moral virtue is inseparable from the human
capability for the reflection and substitute required for moral responsibility
(Aristotle 1934, 1113b5-8; hereafter NE). As courage involves confidence and
fear in dangerous situations, in which will leave imperfect control over
external forces, it turns as a test for the very possibility of understanding
virtuous action as the product of a morally responsible agent.
Works Cited
Ambler, Wayne H., "Aristotle's Understanding of the Naturalness of the City",
The Review of Politics 47: 163-85, April 1985
Aristotle, “Nichomachean Ethics”, trans. Harris H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1934
Aristotle, “Posterior Analytics”, trans. Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1960
Aristotle, Politics, trans. Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984
Bodeus, Richard. “Collection D'Etudes Classiques”, Volume 4: Politique et
Philosophie chez Aristotle. Namur, Belgium: Societe des Etudes Classiques, 1991
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